A simple and differential power analysis attack resistance circuit for smart card reader using an integrated power spike vanisher

Abstract

Contact and contactless smart cards are widely used In modern banking and business transactions. However, one of the most challenging issues that have to be strategically addressed is the security of the data inside. In embedded system, for example, Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack are the most popular among the many side channel attacks. High frequency operation is due to the fluctuation happening as a result of sequential circuit clocking during the process of encryption operation. These power spikes are then rippled and can be captured using oscilloscope or any power trace capture device. This study proposed new low-cost, easy-to-implement mitigation techniques. Test results showed the difference between the power traces of smart card reader without the proposed mitigation technique and those with mitigation techniques. It was proven that the proposed solution can match the existing solutions and is sometimes better in terms of SPA and DPA resistance.